Neither soul nor One Mind: Bankei’s Unborn and the problem of metaphysical interpretation
When reading Bankei Yōtaku’s sermons, one may wonder what exactly he means when he speaks of the unborn and undying Buddha-mind. Is he talking about something that exists within each of us and survives the death of the body, or is he referring to some form of universal consciousness that we all share? Both ideas may seem quite plausible, at first glance, when reading Bankei too superficially. But how do they fit with the Buddhist teaching of non-self? Perhaps the problem begins with the way we ask these questions. We tend to look for something that exists behind our everyday experience, whereas Bankei may be pointing to something much closer to ordinary life itself. In this post, I therefore want to take a closer look at what Bankei means by the Unborn, why his words can easily be misunderstood, and how the Buddhist notion of suchness may help us make sense of his teaching.
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Tea bowl (chawan). Suchness, or tathatā, means the things as they are, without the need to posit a hidden essence behind their appearance. AI-generated illustration with DALL•E 2, rendered in the style of Japanese Zenga ink painting.
Introduction
Bankei Yōtaku’s teaching of the Unborn raises a conceptual difficulty that should not be underestimated. His language is simple, but not therefore unproblematic. He speaks of the unborn Buddha-mind as something every being has from birth on. He describes it as unborn, undying, and always present and contrasts it with the body, which is born and therefore perishes. If such statements are read without caution, they can appear to suggest either an individual soul or a universal consciousness behind all beings.
Both readings are problematic. If the Buddha-mind is read as an individual soul, Bankei’s teaching comes close to the idea of an ātman, a permanent self or inner essence. If it is read as a universal One Mind, it risks becoming a form of metaphysical monism, a single cosmic consciousness in which all individual beings participate. Both interpretations turn the Unborn into a substance, either a private essence inside the person or a universal essence behind the world.
A more careful reading however suggests something different. Bankei’s Buddha-mind is not best understood as a thing, a possession, a metaphysical substrate, or a hidden “true” soul or mind to be uncovered. It points to the non-constructed and non-manifested functioning of mind and experience before these are appropriated as “I”, “me”, and “mine”. In this sense, Bankei’s language is actually close to the Buddhist notion of tathatā, suchness, while remaining expressed in his own practical Zen vocabulary.
Why Bankei’s language may lead misunderstandings
The risk of misunderstanding begins with Bankei’s own formulations. Bankei repeatedly says that every person receives only the unborn Buddha-mind at birth and nothing else. Elsewhere he contrasts the body with the Buddha-mind. The body is born, composed, and perishable. The Buddha-mind is unborn. In one poem, he says:
This mind is unborn and undying. Earth, water, fire, and air are its temporary dwelling.
Such language can sound dualistic. The body appears as a temporary dwelling, while the Buddha-mind appears as something that does not perish. It is understandable, then, that a reader might ask “Is Bankei speaking of a soul? Is the Buddha-mind a hidden inner essence that survives death? Does it move on after the body dissolves?” Bankei’s own teaching requires caution here. His sermons do not present the Buddha-mind as an object inside the person. Nor does he describe it as a personal essence that belongs to the ego. When he speaks of the Buddha-mind, he is usually not interested in metaphysical speculation. He uses the term to redirect attention away from thoughts, emotions, anger, fear, craving, and self-centered delusion. The question is not what object is hidden behind experience. The question is how experience is transformed into self-attachment.
This practical orientation is indeed important. Bankei’s language may invite metaphysical interpretation, but his teaching method repeatedly moves away from metaphysical objectification. He points to how anger is produced, how fear is generated, how thoughts arise and pass, and how the mind takes sides for itself. The Buddha-mind is invoked to show that these productions are not original nature.
The risk of reading Buddha-mind as soul
If Bankei’s Buddha-mind is interpreted as a soul, then his teaching would conflict with one of the central principles of Buddhism: anattā, non-self. According to this principle, the person is not grounded in a fixed, independent, unchanging self. What is conventionally called “I” consists of changing bodily and mental processes: bodily form, sensations, perceptions, formations, and consciousness (also see The five skandhas). These arise, change, and pass away, none of them provides a permanent essence.
Bankei’s own examples actually support this non-self reading. When a monk claims that he has always had a hot temper, Bankei asks him to show this temper. The monk cannot do so, because he is not angry at that moment. Bankei concludes that anger cannot be inborn. It arises only under conditions. The point is not merely psychological. It is also anti-essentialist. What the monk takes to be part of his identity is shown to be a produced state. The same pattern appears in the case of fear. When a woman fears thunder, Bankei tells her that she received only the Buddha-mind at birth. Fear was not part of it. It is an invention of thought. Again, what appears to be an inner essence or personal trait is interpreted as a conditioned production.
These examples would be incoherent if Bankei were simply replacing the ordinary ego with a deeper ego. His teaching does not say that the surface self is false but a hidden true self is real in the sense of an ātman. Rather, he shows that what is usually taken as self, anger, fear, thought, pain, pride, and self-defense, is produced and therefore not self.
For this reason, the Buddha-mind should not be read as a purified owner behind experience. It is not “my” deepest possession. Phrases such as “my Buddha-mind” may be unavoidable in ordinary language, but they are conceptually dangerous. Bankei’s teaching is directed precisely against the possessive structure that turns experience into “I” and “mine”.
The Buddha-mind is not a hidden inner object
The most common mistake in reading Bankei is to imagine the Buddha-mind as a hidden interior object. One then thinks, that behind the body, behind thought, behind personality, behind emotions, there must be something deeper that remains identical and untouched. This turns the Unborn into a metaphysical object.
Bankei’s mirror metaphor helps avoid this misunderstanding. He compares the Buddha-mind to a clear mirror. A mirror reflects what appears before it. It does not decide to reflect. It does not grasp the reflection. It does not keep the reflection when the object is gone. In the same way, the Buddha-mind sees and hears through its living functioning without deliberate self-appropriation. This metaphor does not point to a hidden thing behind seeing and hearing. It points to a mode of functioning. The mirror is not a little person inside the mind. It is an image for non-grasping clarity. Thoughts, sounds, images, and sensations appear; if they are not grasped, they pass. The problem begins when the mind turns them into identity, possession, or self-defense.
This also clarifies why Bankei says that thoughts have no real substance. Thoughts arise because past experiences are reflected in the Buddha-mind. But if one does not attach to them, they do not become delusion. He explicitly says that even if a thousand thoughts arise, one need not cut off a single thought. Their appearance is not the problem, the problem is appropriation. A soul, by contrast, would be a substantial inner entity. Bankei’s Buddha-mind, at least in his practical teaching, functions less like an entity and more like the non-appropriating clarity of experience itself.
The risk of reading Buddha-mind as One Mind
The opposite misunderstanding is also tempting. If Buddha-mind is not an individual soul, one might interpret it as a universal consciousness shared by all beings, a single spiritual principle behind the multiplicity of persons and things. This reading avoids the idea of a private soul, but it introduces another problem, as it turns the Unborn into a metaphysical substance on a cosmic scale. This is not necessary for a Buddhist reading of Bankei. Buddhism does not require a universal spiritual substrate in order to explain the interconnection of beings and phenomena. The relation between dharmas is classically explained through dependent origination. Things arise through causes and conditions. They exist relationally and contingently. They are empty of independent self-nature. This does not imply that they are all manifestations of one universal mind. Bankei’s teaching can therefore be interpreted without turning Buddha-mind into an invisible metaphysical bond connecting all beings. The fact that every person has the Buddha-mind does not require the conclusion that all persons are parts of one cosmic consciousness. It means that each person can recognize the same basic structure: Thoughts, emotions, and reactions arise. Delusion begins when they are grasped. The Buddha-mind is not produced by these delusions and need not become them.
This distinction is important because the idea of One Mind can become a disguised form of self. Instead of a private self, one imagines a universal self. But the Buddhist problem of self is not solved by expanding the self to cosmic scale. It is solved by seeing through the need for such a self altogether.
Buddha-mind and suchness
A more precise way to interpret Bankei’s Buddha-mind is through its relation to tathatā, suchness in my view. Suchness means the so-being of things before conceptual distortion. A sound is sound. Seeing is seeing. Pain is pain. Thought is thought. A person is this person. A situation is this situation. Delusion begins when the mind adds ownership, defense, craving, rejection, or identity. Bankei’s teaching repeatedly points to this. When anger arises, the problem is not the mere occurrence of a stimulus. The problem is that the mind takes sides for itself and turns the situation into “my insult” or “my injury”. When fear arises, the problem is not the sound of thunder as such, but the interpretation that turns it into “my terror”. When pain arises, the problem is not pain alone, but the construction of “my suffering”, “my decline”, or “my fate”.
In this sense, the Buddha-mind is not a second entity behind experience. It is the non-constructed suchness of experience when experience is not appropriated by the self. Bankei’s language of the Unborn points to what has not been transformed into self-centered delusion.
This is why the Unborn should not be placed beneath ordinary life as a hidden layer. It is not somewhere behind seeing, hearing, thinking, speaking, and acting. It is the clear functioning of seeing, hearing, thinking, speaking, and acting when these are not turned into egoic possession.
Neither individual nor universal in the ordinary sense
Buddha-mind cannot be accurately classified as either individual or universal in the ordinary dualistic sense. As we have figures out above, if one calls it individual, one risks turning it into a private soul. If one calls it universal, one risks turning it into a cosmic substance. Bankei’s teaching is better read as cutting through both alternatives.
From the standpoint of practice, each person must recognize the Unborn for themselves. No teacher, institution, scripture, or ritual can recognize it in their place. In this practical sense, recognition is direct, intimate, and personal. Yet what is recognized is not a private object owned by that person. It is not a hidden possession of the ego. At the same time, Buddha-mind is not universal in the sense of a single entity shared by all beings. The interconnection of beings does not require such an entity. Beings and dharmas are mutually conditioned, they exist through dependent origination, relational arising, mutual influence, and mutual confirmation. Their connectedness is real, but it is not the connectedness of many beings plugged into one hidden spiritual source.
This distinction keeps Bankei’s teaching in fact close to the Buddhist middle way. Beings are not isolated substances, but they also do not dissolve into a single metaphysical substance. They are relational, empty, conditioned, and such as they are.
Death and the limits of the question
The question of death is where the risk of reification becomes especially strong. Bankei contrasts the born body with the unborn Buddha-mind. He says that the body, composed of the four elements, is a temporary dwelling. The body can decay, be buried, or be burned. The Buddha-mind, as unborn, is not subject to birth and death in the same way.
This formulation can easily be read as if there would be something surviving after death. One might ask “Where does the Buddha-mind go after death? Does it leave the body? Does it travel onward? Does it merge with a universal mind?” Such questions may already impose the wrong framework. They treat Buddha-mind as an object that could depart, travel, remain, vanish, or merge. But if Buddha-mind is not a private possession inside the body, then it is misleading to ask where it goes as if it were a subtle object. The body is born and dies. The concrete configuration of seeing, hearing, remembering, desiring, suffering, speaking, and acting that constituted this life comes to an end. Bankei’s point is not that an individual ego survives this dissolution, nor does he require the idea that the individual dissolves into a cosmic consciousness. His distinction between born and unborn points instead to the limits of applying the categories of birth and death to what is not born as an object. This is not a fully developed philosophical theory of death. Bankei’s sermons are not systematic metaphysics. But his language is safest when read as a practical teaching against identification, not as a doctrine of an immortal soul.
The relevance of this distinction
This distinction is not merely technical, but it affects whether Bankei’s teaching remains recognizably Buddhist. If Buddha-mind becomes a soul, the teaching conflicts with anattā. If it becomes One Mind, it moves toward monism. If it becomes a hidden inner treasure, it can strengthen spiritual ego. If it becomes a doctrine to be possessed, it ceases to function as a pointer to direct recognition.
Bankei’s language is intentionally simple, but it should not be read simplistically. When he says that everyone has the unborn Buddha-mind, he is not introducing a new self. He is pointing to what is recognized when the fiction of a fixed self is no longer produced. When he says that Buddha-mind does not perish, he is not best understood as describing the immortality of a soul, but pointing to what is not born as an object in the first place.
The distinction also matters practically. If the Buddha-mind is treated as a soul, one may cling to it as “my true self”. If it is treated as One Mind, one may dissolve practical responsibility into vague metaphysical unity. In both cases, the teaching can lose its practical edge. Bankei’s own focus is actually sharper: Anger is produced, fear is arises, thoughts are insubstantial, self-partiality creates delusion, and the practitioner should live in the Unborn rather than transform it into self-centered reaction.
Conclusion
Bankei’s understanding of Buddha-mind is neither that of an individual soul nor a universal One Mind. It is not an inner essence hidden inside the being, and it is not a cosmic consciousness standing behind all beings. Both interpretations turn the Unborn into something substantial, and both risk obscuring the Buddhist character of Bankei’s teaching.
The Unborn is better understood as the suchness of mind and experience before self-centered manifestations. It is the functioning of seeing, hearing, thinking, feeling, speaking, and acting when these are not appropriated as “I” and “mine”. It is intimate without being a private possession. It is not limited to an individual, but it is also not a universal substance.
This distinction is essential for understanding Bankei in my view. His teaching does not give the self a deeper foundation. It questions the need for such a foundation. To live from the Unborn is not to discover a hidden soul and not to merge into a cosmic mind, it is to stop turning experience into self and to allow Buddha-mind to function as the suchness of life itself.
References and further reading
- Norman Waddell (Herausgeber), Bankei Eitaku, Die Zen-Lehre vom Ungeborenen. Leben und Lehre des großen japanischen Zen-Meisters Bankei Eitaku (1622 - 1693), 1988, ISBN-10: 3502640505
- Peter Haskel (Übersetzer), Yoshito Hakeda (Herausgeber), Mary Farkas (Vorwort), Bankei Zen - Translations From The Record Of Bankei, 1994, Grove Press, ISBN: 9780802131843
- Oliver Bottini, Das große O.-W.-Barth-Buch des Zen, 2002, Barth im Scherz-Verl, ISBN: 9783502611042
- Heinrich Dumoulin, Geschichte des Zen-Buddhismus, Band 1+2, 2019, 2., durchgesehene und erweiterte Auflage, Francke A. Verlag, ISBN: 9783772085161
- Hans-Günter Wagner, Buddhismus in China: Von den Anfängen bis in die Gegenwart, 2020, Matthes & Seitz Berlin, ISBN: 978-3957578440
- Jr. Buswell, Robert E., Jr. Lopez, Donald S., Juhn Ahn, J. Wayne Bass, William Chu, The Princeton dictionary of Buddhism, 2014, Princeton University Press, ISBN: 978-0-691-15786-3
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